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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON OBTAINING EVIDENCE
FOR SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS
Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law
Case Western Reserve University

Through the examination of trace evidence,
'many scientific techniques can establish a link
between a suspect and the scene of a crime.
Blood, semen, hairs, fibers, soils, and fingerprints
have all been used in this manner. In addition,
bitemarks, gunshot residues, handwriting and
voice exemplars have also been used to provide a
nexus between a suspect and a crime. The use of
these techniques often depends on some form of
cooperation on the part of the suspect, ranging
from his passive presence for fingerprinting and
extraction of blood to his active participation in
providing voice and handwriting exemplars.
This contact between the police and a suspect
has spawned constitutional litigation. Criminal
defendants have argued that submission to police
control for the purpose of obtaining evidence for
scientific analysis: (1) violates the privilege against
self-incrimination, (2) violates the right to counsel,
(3) infringes upon the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and (4) deprives
the suspect of due process of law. This article examines these arguments.

tion of the investigating police officer. Although
the defendant-on his attorney's advice-objected
to this procedure, blood was extracted and analyzed for alcoholic content. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the privilege against self-incrimination had been violated
by the extraction of blood. The Court rejected this
argument, holding that the privilege covers only
"communicative or testimonial evidence," not
"physical or real evidence." According to the
Court,

SELF-INCRIMINATION

See also Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination: Extorting Physical Evidence From a SUspect, 43 So. Cal. L. Rev. 597
(1970).
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have reaffirmed the testimonial vs. physical evidence distinction recognized in Schmerber. In United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the Court held that
compelling an accused to exhibit his person for
observation was compulsion "to exhibit his physical characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any
knowledge he might have," id. at 222, and thus is
not proscribed by the self-incrimination clause. In
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), the Court
concluded that the compelled production of a
"mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the
content of what is written, like the voice or body

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
prohibits compulsory self-incrimination. This prohibition applies when the state seeks to compel a
person to produce evidence that may subject that
person to criminal liability. See generally C.
McCormick, Evidence§§ 114-43 (2d ed. 1972); 8 J.
Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2250-84 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
The leading case on the applicability of the Fifth
Amendment privilege to the collection of physical
evidence is Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966). While being treated at a hospital for injuries
sustained in an automobile collision, Schmerber
was arrested for driving under the influence of
alcohol. Blood samples were subsequently obtained from Schmerber by a physician at the direc-

It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches
an accused's communications, whatever form they
might take .... On the other hand, both federal and
state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting,
photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for
identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume
a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. The
distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling "communications" or "testimony," but that
compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the
source of "real or physical evidence" does not violate
it. /d. at 763-64.
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itself, is an identifying physical characteristic outside [the Amendment's] protection." /d. at 266-67.
Finally, in United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1
(1973), the Court again applied the Schmerber
rationale in ruling that compelling a defendant to
speak for the purpose of voiceprint analysis did
not violate the Fifth Amendment because the
"voice recordings were to be used solely to
measure the physical properties of the witnesses'
voices, not for the testimonial or communicative
content of what was to be said." /d. at 7.
Under Schmerber, obtaining evidence for virtually all forensic techniques is free from Fifth
Amendment concerns because such techniques
use physical, not testimonial, evidence. See also
United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980) (handwriting exemplars); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S.
19, 22 n. * (1973) (handwriting exemplars); State v.
Ostrowski, 30 Ohio St.2d 34, 282 N.E.2d 359, cert.
denied, 409 U.S; 890 (1972) (handwriting exemplars); State v. Heston, 29 Ohio St.2d 152, 280
N.E.2d 376, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1038 (1972) (handwriting); State v. Olderman, 44 Ohio App.2d 130,
336 N.E.2d 442 (1975) (voice exemplars); 8 J.
Wigmore, Evidence § 2265 (McNaughton rev. 1961).

State Constitutions
It should be noted that state law may afford a
defendant greater self-incrimination protection
than is afforded by federal law. For example, in
Hansen v. Owens, 619 P.2d 315 (Utah 1980), the
Utah Supreme Court held that compelled production of handwriting exemplars violated the selfincrimination clause of the Utah Constitution
because it involved the "affirmative act of writing."
/d. at 317. See also Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511,
192 S.E.2d 350 (1972) (surgical removal of bullet;
Georgia Constitution provides greater selfincrimination protection than U.S. Constitution).
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused
the right to counsel. This right has not been
limited to trial but has been extended to certain
pretrial proceedings such as the preliminary hearing, Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), and,
under some circumstances, to identification procedures, Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977), and
interrogations. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264
(1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
Although defendants have argued that the right to
counsel applies when evidence is obtained for the
purpose of scientific analysis, this argument has
not been successful for two reasons.
First, the Supreme Court has held that the right
to counsel attaches only after the "initiation of
adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether
by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). Frequently, evidence that is submitted for scientific analysis has
been obtained from defendants during the investigatory stage, prior to the commencement of formal
criminal proceedings. See State v. Ulrich, 609 P.2d
1219 (Mont. 1980) (swabbings for gunshot residue
taken before right to counsel attached).
Second, neither the obtaining of evidence for the
purpose of scientific analysis nor the analysis
itself is a "critical' stage within the meaning of the
Sixth Amendment. The leading cases are United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). In Wade the
Supreme Court held that the right to counsel
applied to lineup identifications. According to the
Court, a lineup presents "grave potential for prejudice ... which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial, and since presence of counsel itself
can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful
confrontation at trial ... ," a lineup constitutes a
"critical stage," entitling the accused to counsel.
388 U.S. at 236. The Court distinguished the conducting of a lineup from the analysis of evidence
by scientific techniques:
The Government ·characterizes the lineup as a mere
preparatory step in the gathering of the prosecution's
evidence, not different-for Sixth Amendment purposes-from various other preparatory steps, such as
systemized or scientific analyzing of the accused's.
fingerprints, blood sample, clothing, hair, and the l1ke.

Polygraph Evidence
The one exception is polygraph evidence. The
Court in Schmerber commented on this exception:
Some tests seemingly directed to obtain "physical evidence," tor example, lie detector tests measuring
changes in body function during interrogation, may
actually be directed to eliciting responses which are
essentially testimonial. To compel a person to submit
to testing in which an effort will be made to determine
his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological
responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit
and history of the Fifth Amendment. 384 U.S. at 764.
The courts that have admitted polygraph evidence have recognized the applicability of the
privilege in this context. See generally Note, Problems Remaining tor the "Generally Accepted"
Polygraph, 53 B. U. L. Rev. 375, 390-400 (1973).
"The polygraph results ar~ essentially testimonial
in nature and therefore a defendant could not be
compelled initially to take such an examination on
the Commonwealth's motion." Commonwealth v.
A. Juvenile (No.1), 365 Mass. 421, 431, 313 N.E.2d
120, 127 (1974). The protection of the privilege
would also prohibit any prosecutorial comment on
a defendant's refusal to submit to a polygraph examination. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965); Bowen v. Eyman, 324 F. Supp. 339 (D. Ariz.
1970); McDonald v. State, 164 Ind. App. 285, 328
N.E.2d 436 (1975). The privilege, however, may be
waived. Thus, so long as the defendant voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently waives the privilege,
the Fifth Amendment does not bar admission of
the results of a polygraph examination. See United
States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 734-36 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976); United States v.
Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 97-98 (E.D. Mich. 1972);
State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St.2d 123, 129 n.3, 372
N.E.2d 1318, 1321 n.3 (1978).
2
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We think there are differences which preclude such
stages being characterized as critical stages at which
the accused has the right to the presence of his
counsel. Knowledge of the techniques of science and
technology is sufficiently available, and the variables
in techniques few enough, that the accused has the
opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the Government's case at trial through the ordinary processes
of cross-examination of Government's expert witnesses and the presentation of the evidence of his
own experts. The denial of a right to have his counsel
present at such analyses does not therefore violate
the Sixth Amendment; they are not critical stages
since there is minimal risk that his counsel's absence
at such stages might derogate from his right to a fair
trial. /d. at 227-28.

States v. Sanders, 477 F.2d 112 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 870 (1973) (palmprints); United
States v. Sheard, 473 F.2d 139 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973) (blood); United States v.
McNeal, 463 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1972) (fingerprints);
United States v. Jackson, 448 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 924 (1972) (hair); State
v. Odom, 303 N.C. 163, 277 S.E.2d 352 (1981) (gunshot residues).
The taking of a polygraph examination, however,
raises a different issue. Because such examinations implicate the Fifth Amendment, Miranda
along with its right to counsel requirement applies.
In addition, after the commencement of judicial
adversary proceedings, the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel would be applicable. See State v.
Jones, 19 Wash. App. 850, 578 P.2d 71 (1978) (confession obtained after polygraph examination violated right to counsel).

In Gilbert the defendant contended that his right
to counsel had been violated when he was compelled to provide handwriting exemplars in the
absence of counsel. The Court, however, found significant differences between conducting a lineup
and obtaining handwriting exemplars:

•
..
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE

The taking of the exemplars was not a "critical" stage
of the criminal proceedings entitling petitioner to the
assistance of counsel. Putting aside the fact that the
exemplars were taken before the indictment and appointment of counsel, there was minimal risk that the
absence of counsel might derogate from his right to a
fair trial. Ct. United States v. Wade .... If, for some
reason, an unrepresentative exemplar is taken, this
can be brought out and corrected through the adversary process at trial since the accused can make an
unlimited number of additional exemplars for analysis
and comparison by government and defense handwriting experts. Thus, "the accused has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the [State's]
case at trial through the ordinary processes of crossexamination of the [State's] expert [handwriting] witnesses and the presentation of the evidence of his
own experts." United States v. Wade .... 388 U.S.
at 267.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to
be free from unreasonable governmental searches
and seizures. In some cases, evidence which is
subjected to scientific analysis is seized from a
specific location. Under these circumstances, the
general Fourth Amendment law is applicable. In
other situations, the evidence is seized from a
suspect. The cases involving the latter situation
are discussed in this section.
Typically, there are two distinct Fourth Amendment issues raised when physical evidence is obtained from a suspect for the purpose of scientific
analysis. First, there is a "seizure" of the person,
which brings the suspect into contact with or
under the control of government agents. Second,
there is a subsequent search for and seizure of
physical characteristics or trace evidence. United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973) (voice
exemplar).

See also United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 718 n.
13 (1980); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 318 n.
10 (1973).
Hence, unlike eyewitness identification procedures, the adversary process is thought to afford a
criminal defendant an adequate opportunity to
confront and challenge the state's scientific evidence. The ability to discover and reexamine the
prosecution's evidence, to cross-examine the
state's witness at trial, and to present defense
expert witnesses minimizes the need for counsel.
Moreover, as one court has remarked, "not only
is the taking of the exemplars not a critical stage
of the proceedings entitling an accused to the
assistance of counsel, but Appellant has pointed
to no function counsel could perform, were he
present, save the futile advice not to give the
sample .... " Lewis v. United States, 382 F.2d 817,
819 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 962 (1967)
(handwriting exemplars). Accordingly, courts have
held the right to counsel does not apply when evidence is obtained for scientific analysis. See
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood);
United States v. Love, 482 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1973)
(acetone swabbings for bomb nitrates); United

Seizure of the Person
Before trace evidence or physical characteristics
can be obtained from a suspect, the suspect must
be detained under some form of government control. Such control raises the question of whether
the person has been "seized" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. Evidence submitted for
scientific analysis has been collected from suspects at the time of arrest, during pretrial incarceration, during detention on less-than-probable
cause, and pursuant to grand jury subpoenas and
administrative summonses. If the initial seizure of
the person violates Fourth Amendment requirements, the fruits of the subsequent search of that
person generally will be excluded at trial. See
generally 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4
(1978) (fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine).
Arrest
An arrest is a "seizure" of the person within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See 2 W.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1 (1978). Generally,
if the arrest is valid the seizure of physical evi3

dence incident to the arrest is also valid. While the
arrest of a person in a public place does not require the issuance of a search warrant, it does
require probable cause that a crime has been committed by the arrestee. United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411 (1976). For example, in Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the defendant was
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol
before blood was extracted. The Court held that
probable cause for the arrest existed based on the
arresting officer's observation of the defendant at
both the scene of the accident and the hospital;
the officer testified that the defendant's eyes were
glassy and bloodshot and that he smelled liquor
on the defendant's breath. /d. at 768-69. The Court
considered the constitutionality of this initial
seizure (the arrest) before turning to the Fourth
Amendment implications of withdrawing blood
from a suspect.
In Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), the
Court considered the constitutionality of a detention during which fingerprints were obtained from
the defendant. Although fingerprints and palm
prints were found on the window used by the
assailant to gain entry into a rape victim's house,
the victim could not provide any further description of her attacker than his race and approximate
age. The police conducted a dragnet procedure in
which numerous young blacks, including the
defendant, were detained and fingerprinted. The
defendant was subsequently seized a second time
and another set of fingerprints was obtained; these
prints were used for comparison with the crime
scene prints and introduced at trial. The Court
ruled that the detention, based neither on probable
cause nor a warrant, was illegal and thus the fingerprint evidence should have been suppressed at
trial.

involves none of the probing into an individual's
private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation
or search. Nor can fingerprint detention be employed
repeatedly to harass any individual, since the police
need only one set of each person's prints. Furthermore, fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and
effective crime-solving tool than eyewitness identifications or confessions and is not subject to such
abuses as the improper line-up and the "third degree."
Finally, because there is no danger of destruction of
fingerprints, the limited detention need not come
unexpectedly or at an inconvenient time. For this
same reason, the general requirement that the authorization of a judicial officer be obtained in advance of
detention would seem not to admit of any exception
in the fingerprinting context.
We have no occasion in this case, however, to determine whether the requirements of the"Fourth Amendment could be met by narrowly circumscribed procedures for obtaining, during the course of a criminal investigation, the fingerprints of individuals for whom
there is no probable cause to arrest. For it is clear
that no attempt was made here to employ procedures
which might comply with the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment: The detention at polic(i! headquarters of petitioner and the other young Negroes
was not authorized by a judicial officer; petitioner was
unnecessarily required to undergo two fingerprinting
sessions; and petitioner was not merely fingerprinted
during the December 3 detention but also subjected
to interrogation. /d. at 727-28.
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The invitation contained in this dictum did not go
unanswered. A number of statutes and court rules
providing for detention on less than probable
cause for the purpose of nontestimonial identifica- ~
tion procedures have been adopted or proposed.
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 1305; Colo. R. Grim. P.
41.1 (fingerprints); Idaho Code§ 19-625; N.C. Gen
Stats. § 15A-271 to 282; Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-37
(lineups); Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure art. 170 (Proposed Official Draft, 1975); Uniform R. Grim. P. 436 (Approved Draft, 1974). See
generally 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6(b)
(1978).
For example, an Arizona statute provides for the
issuance of judicial orders covering "fingerprints,
palmprints, footprints, measurements, handwriting,
handprinting, sound of voice, blood samples, urine
samples, saliva samples, hair samples, comparative personal appearance, or photographs of an
individual." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 1305(D). Such an
order may be issued if the following conditions are
satisfied:
1. Reasonable cause for belief that a specifically
described offense punishable by at least one year
in the state prison has been committed.
2. Procurement of evidence of identifying physical
characteristics from an identified or particularly
described individual may contribute to the identification of the individual who committed such
offense.
3. Such evidence cannot otherwise be obtained by the .llil
investigating officer from either the law enforce"
ment agency employing the affiant or the criminal
identification division of the Arizona department of
public safety. /d. § 13-3905(A).

Detention on Less than Probable Cause
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme
Court first recognized that a detention of a suspect on less than probable cause may satisfy
Fourth Amendment requirements. The importance
of Terry v. Ohio and its progeny, defining the
scope of the "stop and frisk" doctrine, to the collection of physical evidence for the purpose of
scientific analysis turns on dictum in Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). As noted previously,
the Court in Davis held that the detention of a suspect on less than probable cause during which
time fingerprints were obtained was unconstitutional. The Court, however, made the following
comments:
Detentions for the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are no less subject to the constraints of the
Fourth Amendment. It is arguable, however, that,
because of the unique nature of the fingerprinting
process, such detentions might, under narrowly de·
fined circumstances, be found to comply with the
Fourth Amendment even though there is no probable
cause in the traditional sense .... Detention for
fingerprinting may constitute a much less serious
intrusion upon personal security than other types of
police searches and detentions. Fingerprinting
4

The constitutionality of this provision has been
upheld by the Arizona courts. State v. Grijalva, 111
Ariz. 476, 533 P.2d 533, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 873
(1975) (fingerprints and hair samples); Long v. Garrett, 22 Ariz. App. 397, 527 P.2d 1240 (1974) (handwriting exemplar). Unlike other provisions, the
Arizona statute does not specify the quantum of
evidence required to subject a person to such an
order. In contrast, an Idaho statute provides that a
nontestimonial identification order may be issued
if "reasonable grounds exist, which may or may
not amount to probable cause, to believe that the
... individual committed the criminal offense."
Idaho Code § 19-625(8). One commentator states
that the "reasonable suspicion" standard of Terry
v. Ohio should suffice. 3 W. LaFave, Search and
Seizure 159 (1978).
Several courts have refused to uphold the issuance of such orders in the absence of explicit
statutory or rule authority. See United States v.
Holland, 552 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1977), withdrawn,
565 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1978) (handwriting
exemplars); United States v. Jennings, 468 F.2d 111
(9th Cir. 1972) (fingerprints); People v. Marshall, 69
Mich. App. 288, 244 N.W.2d 451 (1976) (detention
order for hair and blood samples must be based on
probable cause). Other courts, however, have sanctioned their use. See Wise v. Murphy, 275 A.2d 205
(D.C. App. 1971) (lineups); In re Fingerprinting of
M.B., 125 N.J. Super. 115, 309 A.2d 3 (1973) (fingerprints); Merola v. Fico, 81 Misc. 2d 206, 365
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1975) (lineup). The Supreme Court
has yet to consider the constitutionality of detentions, whether authorized by statute or not, on less
than probable cause for the purpose of obtaining
nontestimonial identification evidence. Nevertheless, the use of such a procedure, at least for the
extraction of blood, would appear to conflict with
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), in
which the Court required a more demanding standard. See People v. Marshall, 69 Mich. App. 288,
297-98, 244 N.W.2d 451, 456 (1976) ("No judicial
precedent was found, however, which sanctioned
the use of a court order on less than probable
cause in order to take blood samples from a suspect's person. Indeed, the constitutionality of such
a procedure appears doubtful in light of Schmerber
v. California ... ").

and, in the case of arrest, results in a record involving
social stigma. A subpoena is served in the same manner as other legal process; it involves no stigma whatever; if the time for appearance is inconvenient, this
can generally be altered; and it remains at all times
under the control and supervision of a court. /d.

In short, since the Fourth Amendment is not implicated, requirements such as probable cause, do
not apply. The use of a grand jury subpoena for
the purpose of obtaining handwriting exemplars as
well as other evidence of identification has been
upheld. See United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19
(1973) (handwriting); In re Melvin, 550 F.2d 674 (1st
Cir. 1977) (lineup; fingerprinting and photographing
also involved); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Schofield), 507 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1975)
(fingerprints); In re Rogers, 359 F. Supp. 576
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (photographs); In re Toon, 364 A.2d
1177 (D.C. App. 1976) (lineup).
The Supreme Court has also considered whether
an administrative summons may be used to obtain
evidence of physical characteristics. In United
States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980}, the Court held
that the Internal Revenue Service was statutorily
authorized to issue summonses compelling a taxpayer to provide handwriting exemplars. The court
also found no constitutional impediment to this
procedure.
Search for and Seizure of Physical Evidence
from a Suspect
Even if a suspect's detention is constitutionally
permissible, the question remains whether the
search of that person is also constitutional. The
initial inquiry is whether there is, in fact, a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. If
there is a "search," the next question is whether
the search complies with Fourth Amendment
requirements, such as the warrant and probable
cause requirements.
Physical Characteristics;
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
The leading case on defining what governmental
activities are "searches" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment is Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967). Katz substituted a privacy
approach for the traditional property approach to
this issue. According to the Court:
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection .... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected. /d. at 351.

Grand Jury Subpoenas; Administrative Summonses
Another method by which evidence may be obtained from a suspect is the grand jury subpoena.
In United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), the
jefendant challenged the use of a grand jury subJoena to obtain voice exemplars, arguing that
3.ppearance before a grand jury pursuant to a sub)Oena was a "seizure" of the person within the
neaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Court reected this argument, holding that the "compulsion
!Xerted by a grand jury subpoena differs from the
•eizure effected by an arrest or even an investigaive 'stop' .... " /d. at 10.

The Katz rationale played a major role in two
cases which involved the compelled production of
voice and handwriting exemplars by means of a
grand jury subpoena. In United States v. Dionisio,
410 U.S. 1 (1973), after ruling that the compelled
appearance of a person before a grand jury was
not a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court addressed the issue of
whether the taking of a voice exemplar constituted
a "search."

The latter is abrupt, is effected with force or the
threat of it and often in demeaning circumstances,

5

The physical characteristics of a person's voice, its
tone and manner, as opposed to the content of a specific conversation, are constantly exposed to the
public. Like a man's facial characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to
hear. No person can have a reasonable expectation
that others will not .know the sound of his voice, any
more than he can reasonably expect that his face will
be a mystery to the world. /d. at 14.

prints, a fraction of an inch away, is difficult to
discern. Apparently, any procedure that is more
intrusive than obtaining fingerprints, voice or handwriting exemplars is covered by the Fourth Amendment. See also United States v. Holland, 378 F.
Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (dental examination not a
search because no reasonable expectation of privacy). This view is supported by cases involving
the obtaining of breath samples, see Commonwealth v. Quarles, 229 Pa. Super. 363, 324 A.2d 452
(1974), and hair samples, see United States v.
D'Amico, 408 F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1969); State v.
Sharpe, 284 N.C. 157, 200 S.E.2d 44 (1973), which
have been considered subject to constitutional
constraints. See generally 1 W. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 2.6(a) (1978).

In United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973), the
Court reached the same conclusion with respect to
handwriting. "Handwriting, like speech, is
repeatedly shown to the public, and there is no
more expectation of privacy in the physical characteristics of a person's script than there is in the
tone of his voice." /d. at 21. See also United States
v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 713 (1980) ("compulsion of
handwriting exemplars is neither a search or
seizure subject to Fourth Amendment protections .... ").
All evidence of physical characteristics, however, is not beyond Fourth Amendment protection.
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966),
decided before Dionisio, the Court held that the
extraction of blood for the purpose of scientific
analysis "plainly constitute searches of the 'persons' ... ," id. at 767, within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the Court in
Dionisio distinguished, rather than overruled,
Schmerber. "The required disclosure of a person's
voice is thus immeasurably further removed from
the Fourth Amendment protection than was the intrusion into the body effected by the blood extraction in Schmerber." 410 U.S. at 14. Thus, there are
two categories in which the seizing of physical
evidence may fall-one within the scope of the
Fourth Amendment protection (Schmerber), and
one without it (Dionisio-Mara). Determining in
which category government activity falls is not
always an easy task.
One other case sheds light on this issue. In
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), the Court considered the legality of seizing fingernail scrapings
from a suspect. After findi_ng that the defendant
had been detained on probable cause, the Court
stated:

Searches Incident to Arrest
If the obtaining of physical evidence from a
properly detained suspect is considered a search,
that search must satisfy constitutional requirements. In other words, once the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment is recognized, such questions
as the existence of probable cause and the necessity of obtaining a warrant are raised. One of the
major exceptions to the warrant requirement is the
search incident to arrest doctrine. Under this
exception, once a suspect has been arrested,
based upon probable cause, a search of the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate
control is permitted. The justific(3.tion for this exception is set forth in Chime! v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969):
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the
arresting officer to search the person arrested in order
to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to
use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search
for and seize any evidence of the arrestee's person in
order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And
the areas into which an arrestee might reach in order
to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of
course, be governed by a like rule. /d. at 762-63.

Several Supreme Court cases involving the
seizure of evidence for the purpose of scientific
analysis have turned on the search incident to
arrest theory. In Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291
(1973), the Supreme Court upheld a search and
seizure of fingernail scrapings under the Chime/
doctrine. During the voluntary stationhouse questioning of the defendant about his wife's strangulation murder, the police observed a dark spot on
the defendant's finger, which they believed to be
blood. Despite the defendant's protests, fingernail
scrapings were taken. The scrapings contained
traces of skin and blood as well as fabric from the
victim's garments. The facts of Cupp v. Murphy are
somewhat unusual because the defendant was not
formally placed under arrest at the time the scrapings were removed. Nevertheless, the Court held
that the "rationale of Chime!, in these circumstances, justified the police in subjecting him to
the very limited search necessary to preserve the

The inquiry does not end here, however, because
Murphy was subjected to a search as well as a
seizure of his person. Unlike the fingerprinting in
Davis, the voice exemplar obtained in United States v.
Dionisio .... , or the handwriting exemplar obtained in
United States v. Mara .... , the search of the respondent's fingernails went beyond mere "physical characteristics ... constantly exposed to the public," United
States v. Dionisio .... , and constituted the type of
''severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security" that is subject to constitutional scrutiny. /d. at 295.

Thus, the taking of fingernail scrapings, like the
blood extraction in Schmerber, falls within Fourth
Amendment protection, whereas the taking of fingerprints, like the taking of voice and handwriting
exemplars, does not. Why a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to substances under his fingernails but not to his finger6
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highly evanescent evidence they found under his
fingernails." !d. at 296.
In United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (197 4),
the defendant was arrested at night and then
incarcerated in a local jail for attempting to break
into a Post Office. Investigation at the scene
revealed paint chips at a window of the Post
Office. The following.morning the defendant's
clothes were seized ..Examination of the clothes
disclosed paint chips which matched those found
at the scene of the crime. The Supreme Court held
that the delayed search of the clothing was constitutionalr notwithstanding the absence of a warrant.
According to the Court, the established rule is that
once the defendant is lawfully arrested and is in
custody, the effects in his possession at the place of
detention that were subject to search at the time and
place of his arrest may lawfully be searched and
seized without a warrant even though a substantial
period of time has elapsed between the arrest and
subsequent administrative processing, on the one
hand, and the taking of the property for use as evidence, on the other. This is true where the clothing or
effects are immediately seized upon arrival at the jail,
held under the defendant's name in the "property
room" of the jail, and at a later time searched and
taken for use at the subsequent criminal trial. The
result is the same where the property is not physically
taken from the defendant until sometime after his
incarceration. /d. at 807-08.
The seizure of gunshot residue, State v. Ulrich,
609 P.2d 1218 (Mont. 1980); bomb residue, United
States v. Love, 482 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1973); and fingerprints, Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313
(1st Cir. 1965), have all been upheld as incidental
to arrest. More intrusive searches, such as those
involving the extraction of blood, however, require
greater justification.
Bodily Intrusions
The Supreme Court has shown a greater concern
for searches involving bodily intrusions than for
other types of searches. For example, in
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the
Court considered the constitutionality of extracting
blood for the purpose of blood-alcohol analysis.
The Court rejected the notion that the extraction of
blood would aut0matically be encompassed by the
search incident to arrest doctrine. According to the
Court, the justifications underlying the search incident to arrest rule "have little applicability with
respect to searches involving intrusions beyond
the body's surface. The interests in human dignity
and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects
forbids any such intrusions on the mere chance
that desired evidence might be obtained. In the
absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human
interests require law officers to suffer the risk that
such evidence may disappear unless there is an
immediate search." /d. at 769-70.
The Court went on to consider the necessity of
securing a warrant based on probable cause as a
Prerequisite to the extraction of blood. The Court
found that the purpose underlying the warrant

requirement-the intervention of a neutral
detached magistrate between the police and the
citizen-was applicable to bodily intrusions. "The
importance of the informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether or. not to
invade another's body in search of evidence of
guilt is indisputable and great." /d. at 770. Nevertheless, because the alcohol content of blood
diminishes with the passage of time, the court
recognized an "emergency" exception to the warrant requirement which was necessary to preclude
the destruction of evidence. The emergency exception recognized in Schmerber, however, would not
apply in other contexts-for example, when blood
is sought for the purpose of typing, a physical
characteristic that remains constant. See Graves v.
Beto, 301 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Tex. 1969), aff'd, 424
F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1970); Mills v. State, 28 Md. App.
300, 307, 345 A.2d 127, 132 (1975). See also State v.
Gammill, 2 Kan. App.2d 627, 585 P.2d 1074 (1978)
(hair follicle, no emergency as in Schmerber).
Schmerber is also important because the Court
held that the scientific procedure chosen as well
as the manner in which it is performed are both
subject to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
requirement. With respect to the procedure, the
Court commented, "we are satisfied that the test
chosen to measure petitioner's blood-alcohol level
was a reasonable one. Extraction of blood samples
for testing is a highly effective means of determining the degree to which a person is under the influence of alcohol." 384 U.S. at 771. The Court also
found that the "record shows that the test was
performed in a reasonable manner. Petitioner's
blood was taken by a physician in a hospital environment according to accepted medical
practices." /d.
The most intrusive procedures that have been
challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds have
concerned the surgical removal of bullets from
suspects for the purpose of firearms identification.
The leading case is United States v. Crowder, 543
F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1977), in which the defendant was ordered to
undergo minor surgery for the removal of bullet
fragments from his arm. The Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit upheld the removal of the bullet,
citing the following factors:
(1) the evidence sought was relevant, could have been
obtained in no other way, and there was probable
cause to believe that the operation would produce it;
(2) the operation was minor, was performed by a
skilled surgeon, and every possible precaution was
taken to guard against any surgical complications, so
that the risk of permanent injury was minimal; (3)
before the operation was performed the District Court
held an adversary hearing at which the defendant
appeared with counsel; (4) thereafter and before the
operation was performed the defendant was afforded
an opportunity for appellate review by this court.
/d. at 316.
Other courts have also found no constitutional
impediment to court-authorized minor surgery. See
Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350
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(1972), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 975 (1973); Allison
v. State, 129 Ga. App. 364, 199 S.E.2d 587 (1973);
State v. Martin, 404 S.2d 960 (La. 1981). On the
other hand, where surgery could not be considered
minor courts have refused to authorize it. See
Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 510 S.W.2d 879
(1974); People v. Smith, 80 Misc.2d 210, 362
N.Y.S.2d 909 (1974). Moreover, one court has held
minor surgery unconstitutional in the absence of
court approval, State v. Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d 621
(Mo. 1977), and another court has refused to
authorize any surgical removal, even if minor.
Adams v. State, 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E.2d 834 (1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974). See generally 3 W.
LaFave, Search and Seizure§ 4.1(d) (1978); Smith,
The Police and Prosecutors Right to Surgical
Removal of Embedded Evidence from an Accused,
5 J. Pol. Sci. & Ad. 348 (1977); 55 Tex. L. Rev.
(1976).

Self Incrimination
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's
decision that the Fourteenth Amendment requires
a hearing before the Parole Authority can rescind a
decision to grant early parole. The Court held that
the principle of "mutually explicit understandings"
relied upon to find constitutionally protected property interests does not lend itself to determining
the existence of a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in the setting of prisoner parole. Although
the Court acknowledged that respondent suffered
a "grevious loss", because the statutes which provide for parole place the decision wholly within the
discretion of the Parole Authority, the Court found
no protected liberty interest and held that respondent was not entitled to a prior hearing. Jago v.
Van Curen, 102 S. Ct. 31 (1981).

DUE PROCESS

Public Defenders-1983 Actions

The seizure of evidence for the purpose of scientific analysis has been challenged on due process
grounds in a number of cases. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the Supreme Court held
that the forcible stomach pumping of a suspect to
recover narcotic pills "shocks the conscience" and
does not comport with traditional ideas of fair play
and decency, thereby violating due process. The
Court distinguished Rochin in a later case,
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). In that
case the Court upheld the compelled extraction of
blood in the face of a due process challenge. In
distinguishing the extraction of stomach contents
from the extraction of blood, the Breithaupt Court
emphasized that the latter procedure, "under the
protective eye of a physician," was a routine and
scientifically accurate method and therefore did
not involve the "brutality" and "offensiveness"
present in Rochin. /d. at 435. This ruling was
reaffirmed in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966).
The Rochin and Breithaupt decisions predated
the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the States
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and thus the continued validity of an
independent due process analysis is questionable.
Such issues no longer need be addressed in terms
of due process but rather as possible violations of
specific constitutional guarantees enumerated in
the Bill of Rights. For example, according to the
Court in Schmerber v. California, the manner in
which evidence is obtained from a suspect is subject to the reasonableness clause of the Fourth
Amendment. This requirement would encompass
virtually all cases that are vulnerable to attack on
due process grounds.

Relying on a public defender's employment by
the County, a convicted defendant brought a 1983
action against a public defender, Polk County, the
Polk County Offender Advocate, and the County
Board of Supervisors alleging that his consititutional rights were violated when the public
defender moved to withdraw as counsel on the
ground that the defendant's appellate claims were
frivolous. Reversing the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that a public
defender when representing an indigent defendant
does not act "under color of state law" within the
meaning of section 1983. The Court also ruled that
the defendant failed to state a claim against the
remaining defendants because he failed to allege
any official policy that arguably violated his constitutional rights. Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct.
445 (1981).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Post-Arrest Silence
In a case involving the use of a defendant's
silence between his arrest and the giving of Miranda warnings, the Sixth Circuit held that it was fundamentally unfair to use this silence to impeach
the defendant. The Court concluded that postarrest silence was not probative because fear and
anxiety will lead the defendant, whether guilty or
innocent, to remain silent. The Court's second
reason not to permit use of post-arrest silence for
impeachment is the widespread knowledge that
one who is arrested has the right to remain silent.
Persons who are exercising their right to remain
silent should not be penalized for it. Weir v. Fletcher, 30 Grim. L. Rptr. 2052 (6th Cir. 1981).
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